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In the past year tax reform has leapt from the obscurity of public
finance textbooks and journals onto the front page of every newspaper
in the United States. The lightning rod of public attention has been the
proposal for major tax reform advanced by the Reagan administration in
May 1985, which followed by six months the release of a set of reform
proposals by the Treasury Department. The principal focus of the public
debate has been a taxonomy of which individuals and corporations
would pay higher taxes under the proposed plan, which would pay
lower taxes, and how large the changes in tax liability would be.
The goal of this paper is to shift the focus of the debate from the
taxonomy of tax reform to the economics of tax reform and, in particular,
to its likely impact on households. Primary attention will be paid to the
proposed changes in individual income taxation not considered else-
where in this volume and to certain critical areas of impact labor sup-
ply, saving and investment, and housing. The President’s Tax Proposals,
which will likely be the starting point for legislative action, will be the
principal subject, although some aspects of the earlier Treasury proposal
will be considered, both because it represents a more radical approach to
tax reform and because many ~)f the alternative approaches suggested
there may eventually find their way into the policy debate. Other pro-
posals for fundamental tax reform will not be considered.
The organizing principle of this paper is drawn from the objectives
presented in the title of the Treasury’s tax reform study Tax Reform for
Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, (hereafter, Treasury I), and re-
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tained in modified order in the President’s proposals. Following a brief
discussion of revenue neutrality, the next three sections assess the Presi-
dent’s tax proposals, (hereafter, Treasury II), in the context of its three
stated objectives. The following section briefly discusses the effect of tax
reform on tax evasion, and the final section offers some concluding
comments.
The design of a tax system must inevitably include trade-offs in the
achievement of the goals of fairness, simplicity, and economic growth.
Because value judgments enter any assessment of fairness and because
success in meeting any of the goals is difficult to quantify precisely,
economics cannot be expected to offer an exact solution as to how these
trade-offs should be resolved. An important objective of this paper is to
identify the trade-offs involved in the adoption of a fundamental tax
reform such as that proposed by the President. Another major goal is to
place the tax reform debate in the context of modern public finance
theory, in order to provide some rigorous framework for a discussion of
the important issues.
Revenue Neutrality
The Treasury II tax plan is designed to be revenue neutral during the
five years after its projected introduction, from 1986 to 1990.1 There is,
however, reason to doubt whether the plan is revenue neutral in the
longer run. The analysis accompanying the plan invites such doubt by
projecting the steady-state revenue implications to be a 7 percent de-
crease in individual income tax revenues and a 9 percent increase in
corporation income tax revenues. Based on the 1990 current law revenue
yields of the two taxes, these changes amount to a $26.2 billion annual
shortfall, or 4.2 percent of total income tax revenue.2
The long-term revenue shortfall in the face of approximate short-
term revenue neutrality is largely due to the expiration of the excess
depreciation recapture rule in 1989; the delayed revenue loss of the de-
preciation allowances, which are significantly more back-loaded than
current law; and the modified accounting rules for production costs,
which force deductible expenses to be capitalized rather than expensed
and thus gain revenue in the early years of the transition and lose rev-
enue later.3
~The Treasury II short-run revenue estimates show a $12 biIIion shortfal! over the
period 1986 to 1990, or less than I percent of estimated revenues. The Joint Committee on
Taxation has estimated a $25 billion shortfall over this period.
2Note, though, that the estimates do not consider the potential revenue gain from
improved economic performance or from improved compliance with the tax system.
3Offsetting these provisions are other aspects of the plan whose revenue pickup accel-
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This long-term revenue shortfall is important for much of the analy-
sis that follows in this paper. Estimates of the investment incentive ef-
fects, in particular, rely on forward-looking calculations of the effective
tax rate, and thus are not affected by a temporary, essentially lump-sum,
tax such as the excess depreciation recapture rule. Thus, the efficiency
implications of the proposed tax system tend to look better than they
must inevitably be in the long run if taxes were to be raised to make up
the 4.2 percent revenue shortfall. If the revenue shortfall is not made up
with increased taxes, then an analysis of the tax plan must deal with the
consequences of increased deficits in the years after 1990.
Fairness
Economic theory has not provided policymakers much guidance
about the proper distribution of the burden of taxes among income
groups. The modern theory of optimal income tax progressivity has
sharpened our understanding that decisions about progressivity must
trade off the social value of a more equal distribution of welfare and the
disincentive effects of high marginal tax rates.4 The resolution of this
trade-off must ultimately rest on a value judgment about which econo-
mists have no comparative advantage. Economic analysis can, though,
be valuable in assessing the nature of the trade-off involved in any par-
ticular policy and in assessing the true incidence of a tax system.
Vertical Equity
The Treasury II proposal was designed so that the 7 percent reduc-
tion in total individual income tax revenues would be "distributionally
neutral," by which is meant that the percentage reduction in tax liability
would be spread approximately uniformly across income classes. In fact,
the percentage reduction in tax burden is U-shaped by economic income
class. Mainly because of the increase in the threshold income below
which no tax is due and the expansion of the earned income credit, the
tax reduction for families with less than $20,000 in economic income is
18.3 percent, significantly more than the average decline of 7 percent,s
vate-purpose municipal bonds, which applies to bonds issued after January 1, 1986. In
this case the revenue gain is roughly proportional to the stock (as opposed to the flow of
new issues) of private-purpose tax-exempt bonds which would have been issued after
1986. This revenue gain thus increases sharply with time.
4See Slemrod (1983) for a review of the recent literature on optimal income tax
progressivity.
Slf, though, the tax reduction is measured as a proportion of total federal taxes includ-
ing the social security tax, the percentage reduction for low-income families is not excep-
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In addition, the reduction for taxpayers with family economic income
over $200,000 amounts to 10.7 percent. Of course, the tax reduction in
absolute dollar terms is much greater than average for higher-income
taxpayers.
Even if these figures were accepted as a reasonable measure of the
vertical distribution of the tax burden, they of course would not show
that the proposed tax system is (vertically) equitable. Rather, they would
show that the proposed system is about as equitable as the current sys-
tem, no more and no less. Even this assessment, though, is subject to
several qualifications.6
First of all, these measures make no attempt to trace the ultimate
incidence of the taxes paid by corporations. Because the drop in individ-
ual income tax revenues is offset by a large increase in corporation tax
revenues, the distributional pattern of the whole income tax burden
depends critically on one’s assumptions about the incidence of the cor-
poration income taXo7 This remains an unresolved issue, although in the
context of a general equilibrium model with a fixed capital stock there is
substantial agreement that the tax burden is spread among capital own-
ers in general. If this is true, then the progressivity of the tax proposal is
greater than the analysis indicates, since capital income is more concen-
trated among the wealthy than is labor income. Once capital accumula-
tion is introduced in a dynamic model, the possibility arises that taxes on
capital income are in the long run borne by workers due to their adverse
effect on capital accumulation and the steady-state capital-labor ratio.8 In
this case, the Treasury’s analysis may not be too misleading. This contro-
versial issue is simply sidestepped in the official analysis by ignoring the
burden of all corporation income taxes and assuming the ultimate bur-
den of all individual income taxes falls on the taxpayer who is liable for
the tax payments.
The issue of the ultimate incidence of taxation is important not only
for questions of labor versus capital income taxation but also for several
6Regardless of the qualifications that follow, the Treasury should be commended for
analyzing the distribution of tax burdens on the basis of a constructed measure of family
economic income, as opposed to a more accessible but less meaningful measure such as
the adjusted gross income concept reported on tax returns.
7See Pechman (1985) for a calculation of the overall incidence of the tax system using
various assumptions about the ultimate distribution of the burden of the corporation in-
come tax.
SThe possibility that the increased corporation income taxes will be passed on to
workers is less likely under Treasury II than under the original Treasury plan, since in the
former a substantial fraction (61 percent) of the increased revenues in the first four years of
the plan come from the recapture tax on past accelerated depreciation. This is essentially a
capital levy which does not affect the incentive to invest in new capital goods, excepting
cash-flow repercussions. As mentioned above, this leaves open the question of how the
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other provisions of the proposal. Consider, as an example, the proposed
limitation of the tax-exempt status of employer-provided health insur-
ance. If the induced reduction in demand causes a decline in the price ot
medical services, the tax increase is less than fully borne by the consum-
ers of medical services and partly passed on to the suppliers of medical
services.9 Similarly, an increase in the effective tax rate on investment in
real estate will be partially reflected in an increased rental price of hous-
ing relative to other prices. 10 Changes in the tax system are also likely to
affect the pattern of pre-tax rates of return earned by different kinds of
assets. For example, the expected rate of return on tax-exempt securities
is lower than that on taxable securities. The rate of return differential can
be thought of as an implicit tax borne by owners of tax-exempt securi-
ties. Reduced marginal tax rates are likely to cause this differential to
shrink, thus lowering the implicit tax on owners of tax-exempt bonds.11
In an important sense, some of the tax reduction is spread from the
owners of taxable bonds, whose before-tax relative rate of return likely
falls, to the owners of tax-exempt securities. Neither this change in im-
plicit taxes nor the induced changes in relative prices discussed above
are considered in the analysis of the distribution of tax burdens present-
ed in Treasury II.
The message of the preceding discussion is that a precise assess-
ment of the distributional impact of a major tax reform is a complex
matter.12 A list of important caveats to the Treasury II claim of approxi-
mate distributional neutrality can be offered although, in the absence of
a more complete analysis, no strong argument can be made to dispute
this claim.
Horizontal Equity
The principle of horizontal equity states that taxpayers who are
equally well-off in the absence of taxation should remain equally well-off
9Such a reduction in demand was much more likely under the Treasury I proposal,
which would have eliminated the tax preference for health insurance at the margin. The
Treasury II proposal features a small inframarginal tax.
1°The ultimate incidence of eliminating the deductibility of state and local taxes is
another important issue, and is addressed in another paper in this volume.
l~Note that the Treasury II proposal features not only a reduction of marginal tax rates
but also several other provisions that affect the supply and demand for tax-exempt bonds,
in particular the elimination of private-purpose issues. Thus, the net effect of the proposal
on the rate of return differential is more problematic than indicated in the text.
~2In fact, there are even more conceptual problems. Assessing the distribution of tax
burdens by examining the pattern of average tax rates by income class in a given year can
be misleading. After all, our ultimate interest should be the effect of taxation on the
lifetime well-being of households. A snapshot of one year’s tax burden distribution will
misrepresent the lifetime distribution of tax burdens if, as is likely, there is a life cycle to
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when taxes are imposed. Many of the special features of the present
income tax have been justified in the name of horizontal equity. For
example, the deductibility of extraordinary medical expenses has been
defended on the ground that income overstates one’s true utility in the
presence of large involuntary medical expenses. Many other features of
the law have been criticized as being the source of horizontal inequity,
including the tax exemption of fringe benefits and the deductibility of
charitable contributions.
Not all instances of preferential tax treatment result in horizontal
inequity, however. If a tax-preferred activity is available to everyone and
valued equally by all, then the long-run effect of preferential tax treat-
ment is only to induce resources to move into the activity. For example, a
subsidy to the purchase of television sets would not be horizontally
inequitable if all equally well-off people had identical tastes for
television.
Many examples of preferential tax treatment are sources of persis-
tent horizontal inequity because they apply to activities which are not
valued equally by all equally well-off taxpayers or are not available on an
equal basis to all taxpayers. For example, the deduction for charitable
contributions favors those who derive satisfaction from charitable gifts,
and the tax advantages accorded to housing favor those who prefer
housing services over other forms of consumption.
Several provisions of the Treasury II proposal are designed to elimi-
nate sources of apparent horizontal inequity. The taxation of a limited
amount of employer-provided health insurance and the repeal of the
$5,000 exclusion for employer-provided death benefits are defended as
correcting the current inequity toward individuals who are not covered
by employer plans and who must therefore pay for health care with
after-tax dollars.13 Repe~ling the deductibility of state and local taxes
eliminates the tax benefits that accrue only to itemizers residing in areas
with high taxes, which presumably finance services valued by the resi-
dents. 14 There are many other examples. Note also that any horizontal
inequities which remain would also be of smaller magnitude if the level
and dispersion of marginal tax rates were reduced.
The Treasury II proposal has serious repercussions for the relative
tax burden on families of different size and number of earners. The
personal exemption allowance is nearly doubled to $2,000, the two-
earner credit is eliminated, full IRA eligibility is extended to non-
13Some of the horizontal inequity would be eliminated if the wages of individuals not
covered by employer plans were higher than otherwise due to the tax disadvantage.
Because the value of the exemption depends on the marginal tax rate, any given wage
increase cannot ectualize after-tax returns for workers in all tax brackets.
~4The advantage of deductibility may, to some extent, be offset by higher land prices
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working spouses, and the child-care credit is changed to a deduction.
The net impact of these is a shift in the tax burden away from "tradition-
al" families (i.e, large, one-earner families). Whether this is a move to-
ward or away from horizontal equity depends on, among other things,
whether children are viewed as an involuntary expense like extraordi-
nary health care expenditures (in which case a large exemption for chil-
dren is desirable) or as a voluntary choice about how to spend one’s
income (in which case no exemption allowance is called for).
Transitional Equity
One unavoidable side effect of tax reform is that it alters the return
to long-term commitments made on the basis of the former tax law.
Consequently, assets that lose preferential tax treatment will likely expe-
rience capital losses, while assets with a reduced tax burden will likely
experience capital gains. Individuals who have made long-term commit-
ments, such as career or locational choices, on the basis of previous law
may be capriciously rewarded or penalized.
In many cases, these gains and losses cannot be justified as recovery
of tax benefits unfairly received or as compensation for excess taxes
unfairly paid. Once the current law has been in place for several years,
the benefits of preferential tax treatment may be reflected in the price of
the asset or activity. For example, preferential tax treatment of real estate
undoubtedly generated capital gains for landowners when the provi-
sions were enacted. Subsequent purchasers of land and real estate have
had to pay a higher price that reflected the tax advantages, and therefore
are unlikely to have earned an extraordinary after-tax rate of return on
their investment.15 Revoking the tax preferences would cause a capital
loss to all owners of real estate, whether or not the current owners
received a capital gain when the provisions were enacted.
The Treasury II tax plan is certainly not immune from this "transi-
tional equity" problem of windfall gains and losses. Real estate and
housing would likely fall in value, as would shares in financial institu-
tions, while shares of service and high-tech firms would probably in-
crease in value. The return to high-income itemizers of locating in high-
tan states will fall if sub-federal tax deductibility is eliminated.
The Treasury II proposal attempts to reduce transitional inequities
by gradually phasing in several provisions. This allows time for adjust-
ment to the new rules and reduces the present value of induced gains
and losses. For example, the tightening of the interest deduction limita-
ISThis is another example of how preferential tax treatment may not result in horizon-
tal inequity. It presumes that all equally well-off people have equal access to real estate
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tion would be phased in over a 10-year period, so that 10 percent of
newly included interest would be subject to the limitation in the 1986 tax
year, 20 percent in the 1987 tax year, and so on; in addition, the new limit
of $5,000 would be applied beginning in 1988. In many cases the
changes are "grandfathered," that is, applied only to new commitments.
The proposed excess depreciation recapture rule can be thought of
as an attempt to limit the transitional inequity of moving to a lower rate
system. Under accelerated depreciation, expenses taken early in the pro-
ductive life of assets were deductible against a high tax rate. In the
absence of such a recapture rule, a capital gain would result since the
income would be taxed at a lower rate, one that is below the rate that
was expected when the investment was made. 16
Simplicity
By almost any standard the present income tax system is quite com-
plex and absorbs a large amount of resources to operate. The Office of
Management and Budget has determined that the 260 different federal
tax forms comprise 78 percent of all federal reporting requirements. 17
Slemrod and Sorum (1984) have estimated that the total resource cost of
taxpayers’ time and monetary expenditure on complying with federal
and state individual income taxes amounted in the tax year 1982 to be-
tween $17 billion and $27 billion. This comprised approximately 2 billion
hours of taxpayers’ time (or about 20 hours per taxpayer spread over a
tax year) and more than $3 billion of expenditure on professional assis-
tance. The total cost of administering the income tax system should also
include a large fraction of the IRS budget ($6 billion in fiscal year 1985)
and the cost borne by third parties (for example, employers operating
the tax withholding system, financial institutions filing transactions re-
ports, etc.). The total resource cost of income tax collection could now
easily be in the $30 billion to $40 billion range.
The Treasury II proposal addresses the problem of complexity di-
rectly by eliminating scores of special provisions and reducing some
structural sources of complexity, and addresses it indirectly by reducing
marginal tax rates. However, some of the proposal’s provisions would
add to the complexity of the tax system. In what follows we assess the
16Note that the recapture rule does not apply to other analogous windfall gains that
would result from the Administration’s plan, such as the taxation of retirement benefits at
a lower rate than expected and the taxation at lower tax rates of the income from oil and
gas investments that were expensed under the higher tax rates of current law. It is also not
clear that it accurately achieves its stated purpose. See Stretch and Sunley (1985) and
Aaron (1985).
17These figures are cited in Hall and Rabushka (1985), p. 30.72 Joel B. Slemrod
likely net effect of the Treasury II proposal on the system’s complexity.
First of all, the collapsing of 14 tax brackets (15, for single fliers) to
three, although promoted by the Administration as a key element of
simplification, is actually an insignificant change in the complexity of the
system. Once taxable income is computed, finding tax liability from the
tax tables is a trivial operation and would not be simplified by having
fewer brackets. This change, though, may improve the perceived sim-
plicity of the system.
Marginal tax rates may affect the resource cost of collecting taxes
because they affect the incentive of taxpayers to invest in finding ways to
reduce their taxable income. After all, the return to reducing taxable
income by a dollar is exactly the marginal tax rate.as Thus, a general
reduction in marginal tax rates should cause a substitution away from
the use of taxpayer’s own time and expenditure in the tax return filing
process. However, preliminary empirical research reported in Slemrod
(1984) suggests that there would be only small resource cost savings
from moving toward a lower structure of tax rates.19
By eliminating the deduction for state and local taxes, it is estimated
that the fraction of taxpayers who itemize their deductions would de-
cline from 37 percent to 33 percent.2° This decline would reduce a large
part of the record-keeping burden for about four million taxpayers.21
Several provisions of the Treasury II proposal are designed to reduce
record-keeping requirements directly. In this category lie the repeal of
the political contribution credit, Presidential campaign checkoff, adop-
tion expense deduction, and two-earner deduction.22 Employee busi-
ness expenses and other miscellaneous deductions are to be summed
and allowed as an adjustment to income only to the extent that they
18This applies to legal tax "avoidance" as well as illegal tax "evasion." The latter is
discussed in the next section of this paper.
19This conclusion, though, rests on the assumption that taxpayers’ sources of income
remain unchanged when the rate structure changes. This assumption could result in an
underestimate of the cost of saving from a lower rate structure if the new system discour-
ages involvement in relatively high compliance cost activities such as self-employment or
investment in real estate.
2°Because the Treasury I proposal also limited the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions and indexed deductible interest payments, the fraction of itemizers was estimated to
decline under that plan to 22 percent. Note, however, that the interest indexing provisions
in the Treasury I proposal, by encouraging households to fully mortgage their principal
residences, would have had the effect of increasing the fraction of itemizing households
toward the fraction of homeowning households, or 65 percent. See the discussion of this
effect in footnote 47.
2~Because expenditures for tax assistance are a deductible expense, reducing the frac-
tion of itemizers will also increase the net cost of a dollar of professional tax assistance for
former itemizers. This is another reason why the reduced itemization reduces the resource
cost of compliance.
22According to the IRS, the Treasury II proposal would reduce the number of lines in
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exceed 1 percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Other simplify-
ing reforms include the repeal of income averaging and the several pro-
visions designed to reduce the incentive to invest in tax shelters.
Several provisions in the Treasury I proposal would serve to compli-
cate the tax filing process. The attempt to expand the taxation of fringe
benefits received by employees will inevitably lead to additional calcula-
tions and problems of appropriate valuation. The inclusion in taxable
income of all unemployment compensation and cash payments for dis-
ability is another complicating provision, as is the expansion of the alter-
native minimum tax.23
Both the Treasury I and the Treasury II proposals are accompanied
by a suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service consider initiation of a
return-free system, under which the IRS would calculate the tax liability
of eligible taxpayers who elect this option, using information that it
already receives from third parties under current law. The IRS estimates
that this program could eventually be extended to more than 50 percent
of all taxpayers,a4
The resource cost saving from instituting this program depends on
two factors. The first is what fraction of eligible taxpayers would volun-
tarily cede their responsibility for tax assessment to the IRS. The IRS
estimates that, for the program to be worthwhile, at least half of all
taxpayers (or nearly all of those eligible) would have to participate,as
There is no direct evidence about what fraction of taxpayers would actu-
ally participate in such a program, although the recent adverse publicity
accorded to the IRS raises doubts about the willingness of taxpayers to
trust the IRS with their tax affairs,a6 The second factor is the relative
efficiency of self-assessment versus IRS computation of taxes. If they are
equally efficient, then this plan would merely reallocate resource costs
from the private to the public sector, but not reduce them. To the extent
that the IRS can more effectively collate the sources of income and ex-
emption amounts, then resource savings could result.
23The Treasury I plan called for the indexing of capital income for inflation, which
would have required additional calculations of all recipients and payers of interest (except
as relating to home mortgage interest payments) and of taxpayers who realized capital
gains and losses.
24Under the Treasury I proposal, the return-free system could have applied to as
many as 66 percent of all taxpayers.
Th~s figure was obtained from a personal communication with IRS staff.
26If the IRS statement of tax liability was binding even in the case of their understating
true tax liability, then one might expect taxpayers to elect the return-free option in the
hope that the IRS errs in their favor. However, as the system is envisioned, the taxpayer
would still be responsible for checking the statement of tax liability and reporting any
errors to the IRS. It may, though, be worthwhile for a taxpayer to elect the return-free
option in order to discern which, if any, sources of income might be unknown to the IRS.74 Joel B. Slemrod
Economic Growth and Resource Allocation
This section has two purposes. The first is to review the role of
taxation in promoting the efficient use of resources and economic
growth, and to assess the President’s tax plan in this light. The second
purpose is to analyze the effect of tax reform on certain areas of particu-
lar interest: saving and investment, labor supply, and housing.
Neutrality and Growth
Although economic growth as a goal of tax reform occupies a promi-
nent position in the title of both the President’s and the Treasury’s tax
proposals, in the body of the accompanying analyses it tends to take a
back seat to another goal, that of economic neutrality. 27 Neutrality refers
to one of the principles of an ideal tax system defined by Musgrave and
Musgrave (1976) as "minimizing interference with economic decisions in
otherwise efficient markets." The idea is that, in the absence of taxes, the
market allocates resources efficiently. Taxes inevitably cause inefficient
resource allocation,28 but a neutral tax system is one which minimizes
the extent of this tax-induced inefficient resource allocation. Three di-
mensions of neutral tax treatment are relevant: neutrality among goods
at any given time; neutrality among factors of production; and neutrality
among consumption of goods in the present versus consumption in the
future.
As of about 1960, the prevailing wisdom among tax economists was
that the ideal tax system was a comprehensive income tax. This tax was
considered to be neutral because it did not distort relative prices (except
as between leisure and other goods), and was felt to be consistent with
the principle of horizontal equity. Unfortunately, the modern theory of
optimal taxation upset the comfortable notion that the most efficient tax
system is necessarily one that alters the relative prices of goods as little
as possible. Optimal tax theory first addressed a one-period world. Ig-
noring intertemporal considerations, the theory demonstrated that com-
prehensive income taxation is efficient only for a restricted class of
preferences.29 More generally, it is efficient to differentially tax goods
and sources of income.
The practical significance of static optimal tax theory has proven to
~TThis is especially true of the Treasury I proposal. For example, the overview volume
of the Treasury’s report lists 13 goals of tax reform. Economic neutrality is placed first,
while economic growth is discussed third from last, just before "trade-offs."
XSTaxes such as poll taxes (called lump-sum taxes because they do not depend on any
economic decision) are not distortionary, but are rarely used because they violate other
principles of an ideal tax, especially equity.
R~In the presence of a nonlinear income tax schedule, uniform taxation is optimal only
if no good is a relative complement to leisure compared to any other good. See Atkinson
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be limited. Its critical weakness, as Deaton (1984) and others have con-
vincingly argued, is that econometric investigation is unlikely ever to be
decisive in specifying the characteristics of an optimal tax structure. In
the absence of such evidence, uniform taxation of goods remains the
standard for judging neutrality, although its theoretical underpinning is
problematic, a0
The same theory of optimal taxation has been somewhat kinder
to the notion of uniform factor taxation as a standard of neutrality.
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) demonstrated that under very general con-
ditions production efficiency (i. e., uniform relative factor prices faced by
all producers) is desirable as long as all commodities and pure profits can
be taxed. Thus, any policy which imposes different effective tax rates on
the same factor when used in different sectors is a source of inefficiency
to the economy. Furthermore, differential taxation of different kinds of
capital goods is, under general conditions, a source of inefficiency.
What of economic growth, and its desirability? First of all, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that, in the long run, the rate of economic
growth is determined by the rate of technological progress and growth
of the labor supply. Tax policy that increases the rate of saving and
investment may increase the growth rate for several years as the econo-
my moves toward a higher capital/output ratio, but the impact on the
growth rate will eventually disappear as the new steady state is ap-
proached. A more appropriate issue is the desirability of increasing sav-
ing and investment, with the goal of attaining a higher capital/output
ratio.3~ Optimal taxation theory can be usefully applied in an intertem-
poral context by simply labeling consumption in different periods as
separate goods. From this perspective, income taxation is not neutral
because taxation of capital income essentially increases the price of con-
sumption undertaken in the future. Furthermore, uniform taxation of
goods corresponds to the case of a consumption tax or zero taxation of
capital income. The condition under which this tax structure is optimal
is identical to the one discussed above, that neither present nor future
consumption be a relative complement to leisure. No convincing evi-
dence has yet been found to either support or reject this characterization
of preferences, So that the proper tax treatment of capital income has not
been established even in the context of simple models of the economy.32
3°Preferential tax treatment can be justified on efficiency grounds if there are positive
externalities associated with an activity.
alThis statement is not meant to discount the importance of the appropriate tax policy
toward research and development. The Treasury II tax plan, though, contains no major
chan, ses in this area.
~An inefficiently low capital stock may also arise in models with overlapping genera-
tions and no bequests. In this case, one objective of tax policy may be to induce capital
formation. This may imply preferential taxation of capital income. See King (1980) for a
discussion of these issues.76 Joel B. Slemrod
Several recent studies have attempted to measure the welfare cost of
tax-induced resource misallocation in the United States and the gain
from specific policies designed to reduce this misallocation. Ballard,
Shoven, and Whalley (1985) calculated, using 1973 data, that the annual
value of the efficiency cost is in the range of 13 to 22 percent of revenues
raised, or from 4.0 to 6.7 percent of GNP. Because the Treasury II propos-
als do not, of course, completely eliminate this welfare cost, these fig-
ures are usefully considered as an upper bound on the potential gain
from improving the efficiency of the tax system. Gravelle’s (1985) analy-
sis of the Treasury II proposal, though, concluded that the capital in-
come taxation provisions alone would, by reducing both the differential
tax treatment of different assets and of capital used in different sectors,
improve the efficiency of resource allocation enough to increase GNP by
1.1 percent. Gordon and Slemrod (1983) estimated that the elimination
of local property tax deductibility could, by greatly reducing the subsidy
to municipal expenditures, cause efficiency gains of as much as 0.9 per-
cent of GNP.
All of these quantitative results depend critically on certain model-
ing choices which remain controversial among economists.33 However,
they are illustrative of the magnitude of the possible efficiency gains
from reform of the tax system. Improved resource allocation does not
have a natural constituency, but it is a source of improved national well-
being nevertheless. As important as ensuring that the size of the pie
grows or that it is distributed fairly is ensuring that the ingredients are
present in the right proportions.
Efficient resource allocation is a valuable perspective for the topics
that follow--the impact of tax reform on saving and investment, labor
supply, and housing. Although still a controversial position, a large and
growing fraction of economists argue that U.S. saving, investment, and
capital stock are too low, and that the tax system should be changed to
increase them. Aggregate labor supply is clearly too low compared to its
level under a first-best (lump-sum) tax system, but whether it is too low
compared to its optimal second-best level is a complicated issue, de-
pending on unknown characteristics of preferences and entwined with
resolution of optimal tax progressivity. Due to preferential tax treatment,
the share of capital allocated to housing is above its efficient level.
Saving and Investment
Several aspects of the Treasury II proposal would affect the incentive
to save and invest in U.S. productive assets. In a closed economy, the
33For example, both the Gravelle study and the Gordon and Slemrod study assume
unitary elasticities of demand for final goods and inputs. If actual elasticities are lower
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combination of these impacts determines the change in the flow of sav-
ing and investment (which must be equal) and the change in the level of
interest rates. In a world with international capital flows, the impact on
national saving and domestic investment can differ. This section dis-
cusses the proposal’s impact on incentives to save and invest, the net
effect of these changed incentives, and how the presence of internation-
ally mobile capital affects these conclusions.
Two aspects of the Treasury II proposal have potentially important
implications for the incentive to, save because they may affect the mar-
ginal after-tax rate of return to saving. They are the expansion of Individ-
ual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and the reduction in marginal tax
rates. 34
Under the Treasury II proposal, married couples with total compen-
sation of $4,000 or more would be entitled to an annual $4,000 IRA
contribution regardless of how much of the total compensation was gen-
erated by either spouse,a5 Under current law, a couple with one working
spouse is limited to a $2,500 contribution per year. To what extent this
provision will stimulate saving depends on the rate-of-return respon-
siveness of saving and on whether the expansion of IRAs will in fact
increase the rate of return at the margin of new saving.
Because households can reduce their current tax liability without
any increase in saving by transferring previously accumulated assets
into the IRA, any IRA scheme may not be an incentive to new saving.
This problem applies particularly to the initial years after implementa-
tion of an IRA plan, when there is a large amount of accumulated wealth
to transfer into IRAs. The proposed expansion of the limit on annual
contributions for one-earner families will hasten the transition period
that elapses before the program can become effective at the margin for
these families.
Note, however, that because households can borrow (with deduct-
ible interest) and place the borrowed funds in their IRAs, it is possible
that no new saving occurs due to IRA accounts. Feldstein and Feenberg
(1983) discount the importance of this possibility, claiming that few
households have the opportunity to borrow without collateral and not-
ing that IRA funds cannot legally be accepted as collateral. However,
borrowing against home equity could provide funds for the IRA and
prolong the transition period. In any event, the limitation on the deduct-
ibility of interest payments in the Treasury II proposal would reduce the
attractiveness of borrowing in order to invest in an IRA account.
~The indexation of interest payments and receipts, proposed in the Treasury I plan,
would also have had major implications for saving and investment.
3STreasury I proposal expanded the limit to $2,500 per spouse.78 Joel B, Slemro~
Even in the long run and ignoring the possibility of borrowing, ar
IRA program with a cap on annual allowable contributions will not b~
effective at the margin for households whose desired annual saving ex-
ceeds the cap. By increasing the limit from $2,250 to $4,000 for married
couples with one earner, the proposal would potentially expand the
population for whom the IRA is effective at the margin in the long run.
However, based on a study of 1972 tax return and financial data, Feld,
stein and Feenberg concluded that an IRA plan less generous than cur-
rent law (and much less generous than the Treasury II proposal) would
apply at the margin for most savers.B6 This finding implies that the
proposal to further expand the IRA limit would probably not be effective
at increasing the marginal rate of return to saving for more than a small
fraction of households.
The lowered marginal tax rates of the Treasury II proposal will tend
to increase the after-tax rate of return to saving for given pre-tax rates ot
return. This is offset to some degree by the increased effective state and
local-income tax rates for itemizers who lose tax deductibility, and by the
elimination of some tax-preferred methods of saving, such as private-
purpose municipal bonds. The precise relationship between reduction in
marginal tax rates and the corresponding increase in the marginal after-
tax return to saving is complicated because the income from many forms
of saving is already effectively tax-exempt or tax-preferred.
Determining the magnitude of the aggregate saving response to
higher rates of return is also problematic. As is well known, econometric
estimates of this response vary widely. Much applied work has utilized
Boskin’s (1978) estimate of an interest elasticity of saving equal to 0.4,
although the methodology underlying this estimate remains highly con-
troversial. Continuing in the tradition of using Boskin’s estimate as a
benchmark for quantitatively assessing saving responses, the reduction
in marginal rates itself could be expected to increase saving by less than
2 percent, holding the interest rate constant.37
Assessing the impact of the proposal on corporate investment de-
mand is another difficult task. On the one hand, the analysis accompa-
nying the Treasury II proposal estimates that the corporate-level effective
tax rate on equity-financed investment would fall from 35 to 26 percent if
all its provisions were enacted. (This decline reflects an increase in the
36They also concluded that such a plan would quickly exhaust the available assets of
most taxpayers, making the transition period very short.
37The average federal marginal tax rate (weighted by wages and salaries) falls from
23.6 to 19.1 percent. Adjusting for the loss of sub-federal tax deductibility yields about a
4,4 percent increase in the after-tax rate of return, which implies a 1.76 percent increase in
saving for an interest elasticity of 0.4. This calculation assumes that the after-tax rate of
return on a taxable saving instrument bears the same relationship to the actual marginal
after-tax return to saving as it did over the period of Boskin’s study.EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS
crea~e in the effective tax rate on investment in equipment and a reduc-
tion in the effective tax rate on investment in structures and inventories.)
On the other hand, the revenue projections show increases in corpora-
tion tax revenues of about 25 percent over the period 1986 to 1990.
Some reconciliation of these two apparently contradictory state-
ments is possible. Nearly $60 billion in revenue is raised between 1986
and 1989 by the excess depreciation recapture rule, which does not affect
the incen~tive to make new investments. Furthermore, the change to a
more back-loaded system of capital cost recovery allowances accelerates
revenue that will later be lost as larger depreciation allowances are taken
in the later years of capital goods’ productive lifetimes.
Nevertheless, the Administration has estimated that, when "fully
effective," the corporation income tax would raise 9 percent more rev-
enue than under current law. How this is compatible with a sharp de-
cline in the corporate-level effective tax rate on new investment is a most
difficult question to answer. Part of the answer is that the effective tax
rate calculations do not consider some revenue-raising provisions that
do not apply generally to investment, but do apply at the margin of
some new investment. For example, the revised accounting rules for
multiperiod construction will increase effective tax rates for certain in-
vestment activities, but are not considered in the effective tax rate calcu-
lations. Another part of the answer is that the effective tax rate on debt-
financed investment is not reduced by the plan. Finally, the estimates of
steady-state corporation tax revenues may have erred on the high side, a
conclusion suggested by the finding of the Congressional Budget Office
(1985) that the corporate tax proposals will lose rather than gain revenue
in the long run.
My tentative conclusion is that the tax incentive to corporate invest-
m~Int probably increases slightly, but not substantially.3s This conclusion
also applies to noncorporate, nonresidential investment. Furthermore,
the [axation of noncorporate residential capital income almost certainly
increases, as is discussed in more detail in the section on housing of this
paper. Overall, the taxation of investment is probably not altered much
in either direction, although there is a shift in the relative burden of
taxation from nonresidential capital to residential capital, and from cor-
porate structures and inventories to equipment.
The upshot of slightly increased incentives to save and not much
change in the incentives to invest would be, in a world closed to interna-
¯ ~ional capital flows, slightly lower interest rates and a slightly higher rate
~If saving and investment. With internationally mobile capital, any in-
creased saving would be spread among investment opportunities
~aFullerton (1985) also concludes that the overall effective rate of taxation on corporate
capital would not be affected significantly by the President’s tax plan.80 Joel B. Slemrod
throughout the world, and neither interest rates nor aggregate domestic
investment would be affected significantly.
Labor Supply
The most striking fact about the Treasury II tax reform plan for
assessing its impact on labor supply is the apparent large reduction in
marginal tax rates. The average statutory marginal tax rate would be
reduced for all income classes, with the largest reductions for families
with incomes over $30,000. The overall average of marginal tax rates
would decline by 19 percent, from 23.6 percent to 19.1 percent.39 A
straightforward back-of-the-envelope calculation of the likely labor sup-
ply response to the decline in marginal tax rates is a useful starting
point. Assuming no aggregate income effect, compensated labor supply
elasticities of 0.2 for males and 1.2 for females,4° and a two-thirds share
of total labor income going to males, one obtains a predicted increase in
labor supply of 3.1 percent.4x
This calculation is, though, fraught with pitfalls because the aggre-
gate labor supply response depends critically on the means by which the
level of statutory marginal tax rates is reduced. Three different sources
are relevant: a reduction in the total taxation of labor income, a broaden-
ing of the tax base, and a less progressive tax system.
A large fraction of the reduction in marginal tax rates is made possi-
ble by the 7 percent reduction in individual income tax revenues, which
is offset in the short run by an increase in corporation income tax rev-
enues.42 A shift from labor income taxation to capital income taxation
tends to stimulate labor supply only in the context of a static model. In a
multi-period model, such a shift does not unambiguously increase labor
supply because although it increases an individual’s real after-tax wage
in terms of present consumption goods, it decreases the real after-tax
wage in terms of future consumption goods. The labor supply response
depends on individuals’ preferences.
Some of the reduction in marginal tax rates is made possible by
broadening the tax base. However, in the case of base broadening, a
39The average marginal tax rate calculations are weighted by wage and salary income.
4°These labor supply elasticities are taken from Stuart’s (1984) study of the welfare
cost of the tax system, and are based on his survey of the literature. Hausman (1981) e.g.,
has argued for a higher compensated labor supply elasticity.
4lA 19 percent decline in marginal tax rates, from 23.6 to 19.1, is equivalent to a 5.9
percent increase in the after-tax wage rate. With a two-thirds share of labor income going
to males, the aggregate compensated labor supply elasticity is 0.53. Applying an elasticity
of 0.53 to the 5.9 percent increase in wages yields 3.1 percent.
42Note that if, as discussed above in the section on horizontal equity, the increase in
corporate tax revenues is only a temporary phenomenon, then the proposal is not revenue
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decline in the statutory marginal tax rate is not sufficient information for
claiming that there will be a substitution effect away from leisure toward
work. Because base broadening eliminates the preferential tax treatment
of certain activities, the real wage in terms of some goods will decline,
even though the real wage in terms of most goods will rise. Consider a
taxpayer presently in the 50 percent bracket who under the Treasury II
plan will be in the 35 percent bracket; suppose the wage rate is $10.
Currently, one hour of work buys $5 of food or recreation; under the
Treasury II plan one hour of work will buy $6.50 of these goods. Con-
versely, while under current law one hour of work could provide $10
worth of municipal services financed by deductible property taxes, un-
der the Treasury II plan one additional hour of work may provide only
$6.50 more of these goods because the deductibility is eliminated.4~ In
this case, even the direction of the substitution effect is not unambig-
uous, and depends on the shape of individuals’ preference functions.
More directly, eliminating the deductibility of state and local income
taxes reduces the combined federal, state, and local marginal tax rate on
labor income for itemizers by less than the decline in the federal margin-
al tax rate. The increase in the effective impact of sub-federal income
taxes tends to offset the federal rate reduction that the increased revenue
gained from eliminating deductibiIity allows. Similarly, the elimination
of the two-earner credit would tend to offset the reduction in statutory
marginal tax rates for those who currently make use of it. Note that this
provision applies to the lower-earning spouse, whose labor supply be-
havior is widely believed to be more sensitive to wages than that of the
primary wage earner.
One possible way to reduce the average level of marginal tax rates
while not reducing the revenue yield is to reduce the progressivity of the
tax system.44 Hausman (1981) e.g., has argued, on the basis of his
econometric analysis of labor supply behavior, that moving to a com-
pletely flat-rate income tax would, at the cost of diminished progres-
sivity, substantially increase aggregate labor supply as well as reduce the
resource misallocation costs of the tax system.4s Hausman’s estimate is
not, however, a reliable guide to the likely effect of the Treasury II pro-
posal on labor supply because, by design, the plan does not significantly
alter the progressivity of the tax system.46
43Under the Treasury I plan, this argument also applied to employer-provided health
insurance and charitable contributions, depending on the circumstances involved.
44On the relationship between progressivity and labor supply, see Sandmo (1983).
4SThe estimated increase in labor supply is 10.7 percent, based on Table 7 of Hausman
(1981) and information contained in the text, Hausman’s analysis has Been challenged by
Heckman (1983) and Browning (1985).
46However/see the section above on vertical equity for a discussion of the difficulties
of assessing the distributional impact of the plan.82 Joel B. Slemrod
In conclusion, the reduction in statutory marginal tax rates would
be expected, ceteris paribus, to increase the desired supply of labor by as
much as 3 percent. The true after-tax real wage rate would not, though,
rise by as much as a simple extrapolation from marginal tax rates would
indicate. This would mitigate, though probably not eliminate, the in-
creased incentive to supply labor. In this case, the perception that after-
tax wages have increased may be as important as the reality that the true
return to working has not changed quite as much.
Housing
Under current law, the return to owner-occupied housing is untaxed
at the federal level and the return to investing in rental housing is prefer-
entially taxed. In broad outline, the Treasury II tax proposal leaves un-
changed the federal taxation of owner-occupied housing but, by
eliminating property tax deductibility, may increase its overall rate of
taxation. It also increases the rate of taxation on rental housing. This
section discusses these changes in more detail and attempts to trace out
their implications for housing markets.
The Treasury II proposal affects owner-occupied housing through
three principal avenues: the elimination of the deductibility of local
property taxes, the restriction of interest deductibility for borrowing oth-
er than on mortgages for principal residences, and the changes in the
rate of taxation on competing uses of capital.47
Holding the interest rate constant, the decline in individual margin-
al tax rates increases the user cost of owner-occupied housing. To the
extent that housing is financed by borrowing, it increases the after-tax
cost of borrowing for itemizing households only.48 To the extent that
housing is equity-financed, the decline in tax rates increases user cost if
47In the Treasury 1 proposal, a fourth aspect was critical--the indexation of interest
payments and receipts. Under the indexation scheme, interest receipts and payments
(other than for mortgages on principal residences and up to $5,000 of other net interest
expenses) would have been adjusted downward to approximate the portion that repre-
sented real income or expense. The exemption of mortgage interest from indexing would
have provided a strong incentive for all itemizing homeowners to be mortgaged up to the
value of their principal residence. The portion of the loan that formerly represented equity
in the house could be invested in a taxable security with similar characteristics to the
mortgage loan. The individual’s portfolio then would essentially be unchanged, but the
individual would earn an arbitrage profit since all mortgage interest would be deductible
but only the real portion of the interest receipts would be taxable; the proceeds from the
bond would pay the interest on the home equity loan. Because owning a house would be
required to support this arbitrage, the net result of this provision would be to reduce the
user cost of owner-occupied housing to itemizing households to an extent determined by
the rate of inflation, the nominal interest rate, and the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.
4~The fraction of households that itemize (now at an all-time high of 37 percent) is
significantly below the fraction of households that are owner-occupiers (about 65 percent).EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS 83
it increases the after-tax rate of return on alternative investments. For
high-bracket taxpayers who primarily invest in tax-exempt assets this
connection is indirect, occurring only if the rate of return on tax-exempt
assets rises in order to remain competitive with fully-taxed assets. As the
previous section discussed, the Treasury II tax reform plan is not likely to
induce a large change in the general level of interest rates, though per-
haps a slight decline could be expected.
The effect on housing demand of eliminating property tax deduct-
ibility depends on the essential nature of the property tax. If it is viewed
as a distorting tax on capital, then eliminating the deductibility increases
the effective taxation of housing and consequently the user cost of hous-
ing for itemizerso If, following Tiebout (1956) and Hamilton (1976), the
property tax is simply the price for municipally provided services, then
eliminating deductibility will in the long run have no effect on the de-
mand for housing. The net price of municipal services to itemizing
homeowners will increase, leading households to seek out communities
which offer lower levels of services, but no smaller average house
values.
There is a limitation on deductible interest expenses under current
law, but mortgage interest is exempt from the limit. The Treasury II
proposal subjects mortgage interest secured by a non-principal resi-
dence to this limit, though an exemption worth at least $5,000 is pro-
vided and the new rules are phased in gradually over a 10-year period.
This provision will increase the cost of second homes unless desired
debt can be shifted onto the principal residence or debt financing is not
required.
Several provisions of the Treasury II proposal would affect the prof-
itability of investment in real estate, and would thereby influence the
supply and equilibrium price of rental housing. The most important of
these are (i) the replacement of the ACRS depreciation schedule with a
stretched-out, though indexed, depreciation schedule; (ii) the substitu-
tion of full taxation of real capital gains (with no loss limitation) for
depreciable assets in place of the long-term capital gains exclusion;
(iii) immediate taxation of pledged receivables, which eliminates the de-
ferral of taxation on installment sales; (iv) the extension of the "at-risk"
limitations on deductible losses to real estate; (v) repeal of the special
investment tax credit for rehabilitation of certain old or historic build-
ings; (vi) the expanded limitation on interest deductions, proposed to
include interest on mortgages for non-principal residences and the tax-
payer’s share of the interest expense of limited partnerships and most
Subchapter S corporations; (vii) the elimination of tax-exempt industrial
development bond financing for multifamily housing and (viii) repeal of
the special five-year amortization of expenditures to rehabilitate low-84 Joel B. Sletnrod
income housing.49
Most recent analyses have concluded that the net effect of the provi-
sions that directly affect real estate plus the reduction in marginal tax
rates would be to substantially reduce the after-tax rate of return of a
typical real estate investment, holding constant the rental rates and the
value of real estate. Downs (1985), in an extensive discussion of this
issue, estimated that in order to maintain the same real after-tax return,
rental rates would have to rise by between 5 and 10 percent.
This result may seem somewhat surprising in view of the fact that
most economists have concluded that the current tax system favors in-
vestment in equipment compared to investment in structures. In this
case, a policy which moves in the direction of uniform taxation of all
types of investment would be expected to favor real estate compared to
other types of investment. Some reconciliation of these two apparently
incompatible views is possible. The standard analysis refers to the
corporate-level effective rate of taxation of an equity-financed invest-
ment. The recent studies of tax reform’s impact on real estate focus on a
highly leveraged investment made by a top-bracket individual (often
held through some kind of partnership) where the current preferential
treatment of capital gains can be exploited by sale of the asset well before
its productive life has ended and many of the other special tax provi-
sions that apply to real estate are utilized. The tax consequences of Gen-
eral Motors erecting a building to house its assembly lines are quite
different from those of a limited partnership putting up a multi-family
apartment building. The first conclusion is that, disregarding leverage,
the Treasury II proposal increases the taxation of real estate relative to
investment in corporate structures and inventories, and arguably in-
creases it relative to investment in equipment.
A second key aspect of these analyses is that the real estate invest-
ment is assumed to be highly leveraged. This implies that any change in
the underlying return becomes greatly magnified in the return to the
leveraged investment. Furthermore, a decline in the tax rate against
which interest deductions are taken, holding constant the effective tax
rate on an equity investment, can greatly reduce the after-tax return to a
leveraged investment. Since the decline in tax rates applies to borrowing
for any purpose, it is not clear why this implies a relative disadvantage
to real estate. The role of leverage is explored in what follows.
Consider the problem first in a stylized economy where there is no
risk, all wealth owners have identical marginal tax rates, and all real
income is correctly measured for tax purposes and fully taxed. In this
world there is no advantage to leverage, as the after-tax rate of return is
49Two important aspects of the Treasury I proposal that were deleted from the Presi-
dent’s tax proposals are the indexation of interest and the taxation of limited partnerships
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the same for all investments and for all investors. In this economy a
reduction in the common marginal tax rate will not change the relative
attractiveness of the available assets. Next assume that, due to acceler-
ated depreciation and preferential tax treatment of capital gains, the
effective tax rate on equity in real estate is lower than the statutory rate.
In equilibrium enough capital is attracted to real estate so that its after-
tax rate of return is equal to the return to investments in other sectors. In
this case, a decline in the statutory marginal tax rate reduces the relative
tax advantage of real estate, and will cause a flight away from real estate.
An increase in the effective tax rate on equity-financed real estate, hold-
ing statutory rates constant, will have a similar effect. In a progressive
income tax system, high-bracket individuals will find it in their interest
to hold leveraged positions in tax-preferred assets. Low-bracket individ-
uals and tax-exempt entities will find it in their interest to lend to the
high-bracket individuals. The presence of inside debt causes a revenue
loss to the government, because the average tax rate against which inter-
est deductions are taken exceeds the average tax rate applicable to inter-
est receipts. In this world, an across-the-board decrease in marginal tax
rates disfavors the preferentially taxed asset as above, and also reduces
the arbitrage-related loss of revenue due to the flattening of rate differ-
entials. In equilibrium, though, this private loss will be reflected in a
general reduction in after-tax rates of return.
According to this analysis, the Treasury II proposal disadvantages
real estate both by reducing its preferential tax status and by lowering
and compressing the marginal rate structure. The fall in marginal rates
negatively affects real estate because it reduces the magnitude of any tax
advantage real estate maintains, and not because real estate, as an espe-
cially highly leveraged investment, is hurt relatively more by a reduction
in the tax rate against which interest can be deducted.
Introducing risk into these stylized models complicates the analysis
considerably. A risky asset will, in equilibrium, earn a higher after-tax
expected rate of return than a riskless investment. By borrowing at the
riskless after-tax rate of interest and buying the higher-yielding risky
asset, an individual can increase a portfolio’s expected rate of return, but
only at the cost of increasing its riskiness. An accurate analysis of tax
reform must carefully specify not only how expected rates of return are
changed, but also how the riskiness of alternative investments is affect-
ed. The Treasury II proposal reduces the riskiness of real estate invest-
ments by indexing depreciation allowances and by allowing unlimited
deduction of all real capital losses. These features may to some degree
offset the factors discussed above.
The role of leverage in understanding the effects of tax policy also
can look different in a model with risk. In the riskless model, borrowing
is not limited and is not tied to any particular collateral assets. However,86 Joel B. Slemrod
if there are real bankruptcy costs, the ability to borrow (or the interest
rate on the borrowing) may depend inversely on the riskiness and bank-
ruptcy costs attendant to the borrower’s assets. In a progressive tax
system, high-bracket individuals who gain from being highly leveraged
will then prefer less risky, tax-preferred investments. That is relevant to
real estate because it is often argued that, due to better secondary mar-
kets, real estate is subject to lower bankruptcy costs---it is easier to find a
new owner for an apartment building than for a factory. Then real estate
assets can be more easily (or cheaply) leveraged than other assets. If this
argument is correct, a general reduction in marginal tax rates does disfa-
vor real estate precisely because it reduces its relative advantage due to
leverage.
It should be obvious from this discussion that the net impact of the
Treasury II tax proposals on housing is difficult to quantify in a precise
way. The broad implications are, though, fairly clear: both owner-
occupied and rental housing are relatively less favored under the Trea-
sury II plan. The short-run implication of this is a decline in the market
value of housing. Over time resources will shift away from housing,
forcing up the level of rents. How much real rents will increase in the
long run depends on the substitutability of housing services and other
goods and on the substitutability of real estate and alternative assets. If,
for example, there is relatively little of the first type of substitutability,
then rents will tend to rise until the relative attractiveness of real estate
investment is restored to its former position. Note, though, that this is
an increase in the relative price of housing services and, for a given level
of prices, implies a fall in the price of other goods. This change in rela-
tive prices has distributional implications only to the extent that different
income groups spend different shares of income on housing. Low-in-
come households will be worse off to the extent, and only to the extent,
that they spend relatively high shares of income on housing services.
The impact on the rate of homeownership is likely to be small be-
cause the price of housing services will rise regardless of tenure,s°’s~ If
rents are sticky in the short run, there may be a shift toward renting.
This shift will not persist as rents rise to restore the profitability of real
estate investment.
S°Hendershott (1985) draws a similar conclusion.
StOne provision that makes debt-financed homeownership less attractive for ite-
mizers is the elimination of state and local tax deducfibility, the largest itemized deduc-
tion. This will increase the number of taxpayers for whom the sum of non-housing-related
deductions is below the standard deduction, and therefore for whom some of the mort-
gage interest deduction does not result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in taxable income.
This would not affect the demand for housing at the margin (except for those households
who are no longer itemizers), but would increase the relative price of owning versus
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Tax Evasion
A recent study by the Internal Revenue Service (1983) estimated that
in 1981 the individual income tax revenue forgone due to noncom-
pliance with the tax law amounted to $68.5 billion, or 24 percent of
individual income tax receipts in that year.s2 It further estimated that
evasion had been growing at an annual real rate of 4.3 percent since
1973. Assuming the same real rate of growth between 1981 and 1985
yields an estimated tax gap in 1985 of $96 billion.
The prevalence of tax evasion has adverse implications for both the
fairness and efficiency of the tax system. It contributes to unfairness
because it favors individuals who are willing to gamble against detection
and stretch the tax law to their advantage and whose line of work facili-
tates understatement of true taxable income. Individuals who are un-
willing or unable to successfully underpay their tax liability suffer
because higher tax rates are necessary to make up the lost revenues due
to evasion and to finance the enforcement of the tax laws. Tax evasion
contributes to inefficiency because it utilizes resources for the research,
planning, and camouflaging of tax evasion schemes and requires re-
sources for the enforcement of the tax laws. It may also cause inefficien-
cy by drawing resources into those activities that facilitate evasion, such
as self-employment or assets that produce capital gains.
Two aspects of the Treasury II proposal would potentially mitigate
the problem of tax evasion--the reduction in marginal rates and the
paring of special credits, deductions, and adjustments to income. Re-
ducing marginal tax rates reduces the expected return to understating
taxable income, and thus, ceteris paribus, diminishes the incentive to
engage in tax evasion. However, as Yitzhaki (1974) has pointed out, if (as
is usually the case in the United States) the penalty for tax evasion is
determined as a fraction of the understatement, then lower tax rates
proportionately reduce both the payoff to undetected understatement
and the penalty incurred for detected evasion. In this case, there is no
substitution effect toward less evasion from lower marginal tax rates. If,
however, the probability of detection depends positively on the amount
of income underreported, then lower marginal taxes will generally lead
to a substitution effect reducing evasion.
In a pioneering empirical effort, Clotfelter (1983) estimated the re-
sponsiveness of tax evasion to marginal tax rates. Using data from the
IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program survey, which consists
of extensive audits of a random sample of the taxpaying population,
Clotfelter estimated that the elasticity of underreported income with
52This estimate does not include tax revenue lost due to failure to pay tax liabilities
reported on filed returns nor does it include the tax liability due to income earned from
illegal activities.88 Joel B. Slemrod
respect to marginal tax rates ranged from 0.5 to 3.0, depending on the
specification chosen.
Using this range of estimated responsiveness, a 10 percent across-
the-board reduction in federal income tax rates was simulated and found
to reduce the amount of underreported income by between 9 and 26
percent. The Treasury II tax plan features an average reduction in mar-
ginal tax rates of 19 percent (although it is not uniformly distributed); it
also, by eliminating sub-federal tax deductibility, reduces overall mar-
ginal tax rates less than otherwise. Using 15 percent as the decline in the
average overall marginal tax rate leads to a predicted drop of between
131/2 and 39 percent in underreported income, which would raise an
estimated $13 to $37 billion in additional revenue in 1985.53 Empirical
research into both the magnitude and determinants of tax evasion is,
however, still in its infancy. Even a range of estimates as wide as these
results should be treated as tentative and preliminary.
The elimination of several special credits, deductions, and adjust-
ments to income will more firmly base tax liability on activities that are
subject to information returns provided by third parties, such as wage
and salary payments, interest and dividend receipts, and other miscella-
neous income. This will facilitate the monitoring of reported tax
liabilities.
Finally, there is another potentially important link between tax re-
form and tax evasion. There is considerable evidence that taxpayers who
perceive the tax system to be unfair are more likely to be evaders.54 If
fundamental tax reform can contribute to an increased general percep-
tion of fairness, it may directly reduce noncompliance.
Conclusions
The tax reform proposal offered by the President is not as radical or
intellectually satisfying as other plans that have been suggested, includ-
ing that of his own Treasury Department. Nor does it quite live up to its
accompanying public relations campaign, which has hailed it as the Sec-
ond American Revolution and promised substantial tax reductions for
the great majority of Americans. Its less-than-radical nature is not entire-
ly surprising, considering that it must eventually pass through a political
53This calculation is based on several assumptions, specifically that (i) individuals’
underlying attitudes have not changed substantially since 1969; (ii) the ratio of aggregate
tax understatement to tax paid is equal to the ratio of income understatement to income
reported and (iii) Clotfelter’s simulation results for a 10 percent across-the-board cut in
rates can be linearly extrapolated to apply to a larger cut in rates.
54See Mason and Calvin (1984) for a brief discussion, and an opposing view, of this
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through a political system which has apparently placed one important
constraint on the reform package--that no income group or politically
important constituency suffer inordinately in the short run. This con-
straint rules out many plans that feature more radical changes in
progressivity, base broadening, or the tax base concept itself.
Nevertheless, the tax plan offered by the President represents a
clear improvement over the current system. It would induce a more
efficient use of the nation’s resources and thus improve economic perfor-
mance, eliminate several sources of inequity, and potentially stem the
rapidly growing problem of tax evastion. It falls short of its stated objec-
tives by not substantially reducing the system’s complexity or increasing
the overall incentives to save and invest. As with any tax change, it
would generate transitional inequities and could also increase the uncer-
tainty that accompanies the expectation of further future changes in the
tax system.
But what about households, the presumed object of this study? The
foregoing analysis of tax reform in terms of macroeconomic aggregates
and lofty objectives can obscure the implications of tax reform for indi-
viduals and families. The average household would notice little change
in the tax filing process--perhaps a few less lines to skip over. More
people would be aware of their federal marginal tax rate. Tax liability
would decline on average, with the individual situation depending
largely on the size of family, number of wage earners, and state of resi-
dence. The price of certain goods, such as leisure (i.e., working), charita-
ble contributions, housing, and municipal services (for itemizers),
would change and some households would adjust their behavior in re-
sponse. The benefits of improved resource allocation would show up
gradually in the form of increased wages and generally improved eco-
nomic conditions.
Much of the above also applies to high-income individuals, who
tend to have complicated returns with varying sources of non-wage in-
come. Capital gains and losses on their portfolios would be an additional
factor in how they fare under tax reform. Investment decisions would
have to be re-evaluated because of the changes in the relative tax treat-
ment of assets and because of the decline in the return to reducing
taxable income.
The macroeconomic impact of tax reform results from the response
of households (and firms) to the changed incentives of a new tax system.
If the incentives encourage the efficient use of resources, one benefit of
tax reform is improved economic performance. This potential benefit
does not show up in the local newspaper’s calculations of how tax liabil-
ity will change, but deserves to be an important element of the continu-
ing debate on tax reform.90 Joel B. Slemrod
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Alan S. Blinder*
This is not an easy paper to discuss. It covers a great deal of ground;
as Slemrod himself notes, the "topic is not really limiting." Furthermore,
the paper is a fine example of "two-handed" economics. You all remem-
ber the old joke about Harry Truman who, exasperated by economists
who told him "on the one hand .... but on the other hand .... " asked
in desperation for a one-handed economist. Joel Slemrod is careful to be
a two-handed economist. Almost every controversial statement that ap-
pears in the text is appropriately qualified in a footnote. Finally, Slemrod
takes reasonable positions on everything--including the "bottom line,"
which is that Treasury II, for all its flaws, is probably a good deal better
than nothing. So what’s a poor discussant to do?
In my remarks, I will try to cover the same ground as Slemrod does,
highlighting areas of agreement and disagreement. But I should stress at
the outset that the disagreements are mostly on matters of emphasis.
What else can I do? Slemrod basically gets it right.
I think it is worth starting by pausing to ask why we want equal tax
rates; for, after all, the real thrust of Treasury I (and to a lesser extent
Treasury II) is not so much fairness, simplicity, or growth, but tax neu~
trality, that is, equal tax rates on different sources of income.
The economist’s basic argument for tax neutrality is that a more
neutral system gives rise to less deadweight loss. Slemrod states this
clearly many times. He also puts in the correct caveat from optimal tax
theory: taxes that leave relative prices unaltered are not necessarily optb
mal. Finally, he adds the important observation that, due to weak em-
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pirical evidence, optimal tax theory is probably not operational on how
optimal tax rates would differ from equal tax rates. So he expresses the
view that equal tax rates should be favored.
I believe this point is even stronger than Slemrod indicates. First, as
he notes, optimal tax theory says that it is virtually always optimal to tax
different factor inputs at equal rates; and income taxation is all about
taxing factor earnings. Second, there must be an "equal ignorance" argu-
ment-of the type Lerner used to advocate an equal income distribu-
tionl--that suggests the optimality of uniform taxation. Specifically,
suppose there are two goods to be taxed; let t be the ratio of the two tax
rates; and let t* be the optimal ratio (which is not necessarily 1.0). Sup-
pose the deadweight loss from suboptimal taxes is quadratic:
L = b(t- t*)2,
and that t* is unknown with density function f(t*). Then the expected
loss is minimized by picking:
t = E(t*).
If the density f(t*) is distributed more or less symmetrically around 1.0,
then equal taxation is the best policy.
Third, once unequal taxes are sanctioned, politics will make sure
that the deviations from equality have much to do with the political
power of different interest groups and little to do with cross-elasticities
of demand. That, indeed, probably explains the system of differential
taxes we have now. Would anyone want to defend the proposition that
the current structure of unequal tax rates was influenced more by eco-
nomic efficiency than by lobbying efficiency?
The case for tax neutrality is also bolstered by the fact that equal tax
rates reduce the possibilities for tax arbitrage that arise either when dif-
ferent types of income are taxed differentially (for example, when funds
are borrowed to put in a tax-deductible IRA), or when different people
are taxed differentially (as an example, when income is transferred to
children and/or to trusts). In my view, the first kind of arbitrage (which
is prevented by uniform, but not necessarily flat, taxes) is far more im-
portant than the second kind (which can only be prevented by a flat tax
structure). But this is not to say that the second is not a problem.
As I see it, the basic point in the context of Slemrod’s paper is that
tax neutrality often--but not always--promotes "fairness, simplicity,
and growth."
~Lerner, Abba, The Economics of Control, 1944.94 Alan S. Blinder
Fairness
We logarithmic utilitarians still believe that vertical equity calls for
progressivity, certainly in average rates, and probably in marginal rates
as well. In this respect, a single flat rate would not be "fair." Slemrod
stresses that Treasury II is not distributionally neutral, but favors the
poorer and richer ends over the middle. This has proven to be a big
political liability for Treasury II.
In my view, favoring the poor in this way is to be applauded.
Among other things, it counteracts what has gone on in the last 30
years. To cite just one example, the average federal tax rate on a family of
four earning one-half the median income rose from 4.5 percent in 1955 to
10.2 percent in 1965, 15.6 percent in 1975, and 18.3 percent in 1983.2 And
let us not forget that the poor were left out of the 1981 tax-cutting binge.
In discussing distributional changes, Slemrod emphasizes favorit-
ism toward "traditional families." I’m not sure this is a bad idea, given
the likely benefits to society from more parenting. But, in any case, I
would highlight removing the poor from the income tax rolls as both the
primary goal and the primary achievement of these changes in the distri-
bution of tax burdens.
Favoring the rich comes, in my view, from an excessive attachment
to flatness. We have long known that a linear tax structure cannot put as
much of the burden on the very rich as does our progressive one. Trea-
sury II certainly does not. But I guess fairness on this issue is very much
in the eye of the beholder.
But the issue of different tax rates on different income sources is
another matter. Here opinions on what is "fair" and "unfair" are more
agreed upon. In particular, large differences in tax burdens on different
types of income are widely perceived as creating horizontal inequity. It
seems to me that equalizing these rates would, more than anything else,
reduce the feeling that the "common guy" is being ripped off by the tax
system. This element of fairness--which Slemrod mentions near the end
of his paper, under "tax evasion’--is very important in a self-adminis-
tered system. So I would like to take it up in the context of fairness.
Slemrod suggests that tax evasion might now be costing the U.S.
Treasury nearly $100 billion in revenue loss per year. Since annual per-
sonal income tax collections are running at about $330 billion, that is a
huge loss. Furthermore, one guesses that the losses from legal tax avoid-
ance are at least this great, and probably greater. I don’t think there is a
single statistic that makes as compelling an argument for comprehensive
2See Blank, Rebecca M., and Alan S. Blinder, "Macroeconomics, Income Distribution
and Poverty," forthcoming in Sheldon Danziger (ed.), Antipoverty Policies: What Works and
What Does Not, Harvard University Press, Table 12.DISCUSSION 95
tax reform as this one does. And I find quite believable Slemrod’s claim
that the situation encourages otherwise honest taxpayers to cheat. Does
he have evidence on this point? If so, it should be in the paper.
My overall conclusion on fairness, then, is that fairness calls for
equal tax rates on different income sources, that is, for neutrality. But it
also calls for unequal marginal rates in different brackets.
Simplicity
The relationship between neutrality and simplicity is not simple.
Slemrod makes the obvious (only to economists) point that co!lapsing 14
brackets into three does not make the system any simpler. And there are
even instances where greater simplicity conflicts with the neutrality
principle; for example, income averaging and indexing for interest. In
many of these cases, we probably should sacrifice simplicity to a higher
goal. But, by and large, I feel certain that more equal tax rates on differ-
ent income sources would dramatically reduce the complexity of our
current tax law.
Slemrod understands this point, but I think he understates its im-
portance. He states, correctly, that lower marginal rates would reduce
the resource costs of filing tax returns only a little holding constant the
sources of income. But one of the main hopes of tax reformers, I think, is
that lowering and, especially, equalizing tax rates might radically trans-
form the sources of income. As Charles McLure suggests, the cry for tax
simplification may really be a cry to get rid of the tax gimmicks that
enable the other guy to beat the system.3
Growth
The tax reform proposals probably have least to do with growth.
They are aimed much more at static efficiency gains than at changing the
economy’s growth rate. Slemrod recognizes this and, by pointing to
some very large estimated efficiency gains in some recent research, sug-
gests that this emphasis is correct. For example, he cites several places
where we might pick up i percent of GNP. That’s about $40 billion these
days, or about 10 percent of corporate plus individual income tax collec-
tions. $40 billion here, $40 billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking
about real money! And this is an annual flow.
However, I want to spend some time on what Slemrod did and did
not say about growth, because that is one of the two areas where Trea-
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sury II and especially Treasury I have received the biggest public
flogging.
First, I was glad to see Slemrod call our attention to the fact that the
theoretical case for consumption taxation is not as clear-cut as its advo-
cates sometimes suggest. It relies on an empirical condition about com-
plementarity with leisure about which we know little.
Second, Slemrod makes the obvious (again, only to economists)
point that only a permanent change in the long-run productivity growth
rate can change the economy’s long-run growth rate. That is correct, and
I should think that our best guess is that tax reform would do nothing to
this rate. However, an eternal optimist might imagine that we might get
more invention and innovation if some of the brainpower now devoted
to beating the taxman were used instead to build better mousetraps. I
think Adam Smith believed that.
Third, Slemrod points out that we might grow faster for a period by
deepening the capital stock. To do this, we must raise the share of saving
and investment in GNP.
Regarding saving, Slemrod is rightly critical of IRAs as a means of
encouraging saving. Though he uses what in my opinion is an excessive
estimate of the interest elasticity of saving (Boskin’s), he still shows a
small anticipated effect of the tax reform on saving. I think we have all
noticed by now that after about four years of experience with vastly
broadened IRAs and Keoghs and higher after-tax real interest rates, we
are experiencing some of the lowest personal saving rates on record.
But a more fundamental question is this: Why should public policy
try to raise the savings rate above that provided by the free market? One
answer often given by consumption tax advocates is that the income tax
distorts intertemporal choice away from saving and toward consump-
tion. This is true especially when inflation is high. But is that an impor-
tant distortion? That depends on the elasticity of substitution, and a
recent paper by Hall suggests that this elasticity is very small.4 If so,
there are more important distortions to worry about.
Slemrod’s paper seems on the weakest ground where he discusses
investment. He focuses on whether corporate income tax revenues will
go up or down. Why should we be so interested in this? Is it not true
that a constant-revenue change in the structure of the corporate income
tax--one which gains revenue by lowering the investment tax credit and
reducing accelerated depreciation and gives it back by lowering the stat-
utory rate--should reduce the incentive to invest, not raise it, as Slem-
rod suggests?
In any case, I’d put the emphasis elsewhere--on the quality of in-
4Robert E. Hall, "Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," mimeo, Stanford Uni-
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vestment rather than on the quantity. And that, of course, is where tax
neutrality shines. I have a hard time understanding how a tax code that
encourages construction of vacant office buildings is "pro-growth."
There are just a few other points made in Slemrod’s paper on which
I would like to comment.
The first pertains to labor supply. Supply-siders, but not sensible
people, push for lower marginal rates as a way to encourage more labor
supply. Here it is easy to understand the goal, since labor is taxed while
leisure is not. However, there is little reason to expect a big effect. Slem-
rod presents a back-of-the-envelope calculation indicating this. But it
seems to me that even this small number is too optimistic, for the follow-
ing reason. Most of the aggregate labor supply elasticity, he correctly
notes, comes from women. But I think it has been established that wives
work less when their husbands’ after-tax wages rise. In that case, a si-
multaneous increase in the after-tax wage rates of both husbands and
wives ought to yield a labor supply elasticity for women well below the
1.2 that Slemrod uses.
The second point is about housing. Slemrod makes the point that
the loophole for mortgage interest in Treasury I opened a glaring arbi-
trage possibility. He is right, and the point is quite general: exempting
mortgage interest will interfere with any plan to reform the wretched
current tax treatment of interest.
I fully understand that homeownership is a sacred cow of our tax
system, and I probably even have a bit more sympathy than the median
economist for its exalted status. But must we subsidize homeownership
in a way that slaps the goals of both equity and efficiency so brazenly in
the face? Are there not better ways to subsidize homeownership? For
example, a credit in place of the deduction would at least subsidize rich
and poor to the same extent. More exotically, Harvey Rosen and I have
raised the possibility of offering a lump sum payment for first-time pur-
chasers of a house.~ This idea has the virtues of: (1) not distorting
choices in the direction of bigger houses; (2) keeping the price of hous-
ing equal across income classes; and, most germane to the present dis-
cussion, (3) not littering the tax code and/or creating arbitrage
opportunities.
Finally, I come to Slemrod’s two-part conclusion, with which I heart-
ily agree. First, what Charlie Schultze once called the "do no direct harm
principle"6 is a serious impediment to sensible tax reform--one which
will, almost by its nature, generate a long list of winners and losers. If
we are to improve tax policy, and other aspects of economic policy, we
5Blinder, Alan S., and Harvey S. Rosen, "Notches," American Economic Review, Sep-
tember 1985, pp. 736-747.
6Schultze, Charles L., The Public Use of Private Interest, Brookings, 1977.98 Alan S. Blinder
simply have to find a way to relieve our political process of this inhibi-
tion. (Don’t ask me how!)
Second, Treasury II, even though it looks a bit like an ugly duckling
next to the swan that was Treasury I, is prbbably a good deal better than
nothing. Since most economic policy changes recommended by the U.S.
government make things worse rather than better, economists should
support Treasury II enthusiastically, even though it may not be their
favorite bill.Discussion
David F. Bradford*
Joel Slemrod says a great many sensible things in this stimulating
paper. Because his subject is extraordinarily broad, he inevitably makes
some statements with which one might quibble. I propose, though, to
reserve my quibbles for private conversation, and to use my time to add
emphasis to certain of his points.
First is the degree of ambiguity about just what it is the tax reform is
trying to achieve. The reform is being marketed as a tax cut, in spite of
the insistence that it is to be "revenue neutral." Accepting that changes
will be revenue neutral and neglecting the possible efficiency gains, the
reform cannot be a cut for all. It is simply a redistribution of the burdens.
In turn, the reform is supposed to be "distributionally neutral," which
means it is not intended to change the distribution of the burdens be-
tween rich and poor. That leaves changes in the tax burdens among
people who are supposedly similarly situated. However, the main
(though not the only) way in which people who are similarly situated
can be seen as bearing different taxes arises from their making different
choices from among the same set of opportunities. Thus, people who
own a lot of tax-exempt bonds appear to pay less in taxes than do simi-
larly situated people who own ordinary bonds. It is often rather difficult
to understand why people make the choices that they do, but if we work
from the assumption that they act in their own best interests, so long as
each of these illustrative taxpayers has the option of choosing the other’s
portfolio, it is rather hard to support the view that the difference in their
taxes reflects horizontal inequity.
As the example suggests, one might make a case that the tax system
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should make sophistication in portfolio and other choices less impor-
tant. It does seem an attractive idea that the form in which I choose to
hold my wealth should have no bearing on my tax liability. (But then, it
would be nice if, in general, the return on my savings did not depend
upon my making the right or the lucky decision.) Similarly, perhaps my
federal tax liability ought not to depend upon the choice my community
or state makes about how much to tax me, or how much of my pay I
choose to take in the form of health benefits. But there is at least some
reason to question the strength of the case in horizontal equity for re-
forms along the lines now being considered.
On the other hand, as pointed out by Slemrod, the reforms under
consideration will have large transitional incidence effects. My favorite
example of a windfall loss is timber. Presently, timber is taxed as though
it were an asset eligible for long-term capital gains treatment. The Presi-
dent’s tax proposals would treat raising trees like other businesses. Just
what the proposed change would do to the value of existing stands of
timber is not easy to calculate, in part because it depends upon the
openness of the timber market in international terms. But it is quite
plausible that the effect would be a huge fall in value. Owners of timber
property presumably have done nothing special to deserve such a loss.
On the other side of the coin, the proposed reform would drop windfall
gains on other portfolios. My favorite example is the gain that would
accrue to those who have large retirement accumulations. The draw-
down of pension saving would occur at lower rates of tax than had been
anticipated.
Transition effects of this kind are hard to avoid, yet they are by and
large distinctly unjust as a matter of equity. There is a trade-off of major
proportions between the gains in perceived equity of the ongoing effects
of the rules and the equity of genuine burden redistribution in transi-
tion.
The effect of moving toward heavier taxation of capital in general (if,
indeed, that is where we are heading) will, because of the way we man-
age these things (through devices such as accelerated depreciation),
tend to impose a disadvantage on those who choose to accumulate in
the future, but to bestow a windfall gain on owners of existing assets.
(The point needs to be qualified somewhat; a windfall gain on average
does not rule out many windfall losses, as the timber example suggests.)
So we have a rather odd situation of granting a gain to the existing rich
but putting at a relative disadvantage those who are trying to accumu-
late. The situation is of particular interest to me, as an advocate of tax-
ation on the basis of consumption, because I would be inclined to do
exactly the opposite, trading off arguably unjust windfall losses to exist-
ing wealth holders for the equity advantage to those looking toward the
future.DISCUSSION 101
Slemrod nicely reminds us that the labor supply incentive effects of
tax rate reductions achieved by base-broadening may be less than is
often supposed. Essentially, what goes on in tax reform is a great shift in
the rates of tax on many different transactions. In thinking about labor
supply we tend to focus on the trade-off between current work effort
and current consumption of, say, groceries. But to allow lower rates of
tax, and therefore cheaper groceries, requires that other things people
buy with their wages, such as state and local services or retirement
consumption, become more expensive. The supply response is therefore
not the same as one might predict to follow from a simple increase in
current wages.
There is a question raised by Slemrod whether the taxation of cap-
ital is going up or down. As he points out, calculations of effective tax
rates on different forms of investment may lead one to conclude that, on
average, the rate of tax on capital is going down. However, that is appar-
ently inconsistent with the view that the rate of tax on labor is going
down, and is in puzzling contrast with the predicted increase in rev-
enues from the corporation income tax. I have not redone the figures in
connection with the President’s tax proposals, but Slemrod himself has
pointed out that the effect of Treasury I’s elimination of the investment
tax credit, depreciation and inventory reforms, indexing of interest, and
corporate rate reductions worked out to an approximate wash. All of the
extra revenue from the corporation tax came from eliminating special
provisions, such as the timber rules I noted above. It is an interesting
question whether eliminating such special rules should be thought of
more as increasing the tax on capital or more as increasing the tax on
timber. It is a classic incidence problem, in fact, and one we have almost
no information about.
Slemrod reminds us how little we know about the corporation in-
come tax more generally. In thinking about the effects of tax reform on
the incentive to undertake domestic investment, I go through the fol-
lowing exercise: Eliminating the investment tax credit must make invest-
ment less attractive. Further, in a system with accelerated depreciation,
reducing the tax rate makes investment less attractive. The reform of the
depreciation rules as proposed by the Administration (by contrast with
the Treasury’s November 1984 plan) may be neutral. Therefore, the over-
all effect must be to make investment less attractive. But my reasoning
depends upon the idea of arbitrage between debt and investment.
(That’s why cutting the tax rate has a disincentive effect when there is
accelerated depreciation.) If investment is equity-financed, the cut in
rates has a positive effect. We know that financial structure is endog-
enous, but we still do not have an adequate model to use for purposes of
tax analysis. And as the example suggests, it matters.102 David F. Bradford
In summing up his overview of its effects, Slemrod offers his opin-
ion that the Administration’s tax reform plan "represents a clear im-
provement over the current system." That reflects his weighing in the
balance the gainers and losers. Forced to vote, I suppose I come out in
the same place. But I am not very sure that the windfall gains and losses
we are proposing to distribute are adequately compensated for by the
improvement in efficiency and apparent equity of the tax system.
I would mention, in particular, two problems that are not dealt with
in the current effort, and that will certainly cause trouble in the future.
One is the need to do something about the little-understood but impor-
tant interaction of inflation and the income tax as it works through the
interest rate. Treasury I made a stab at this, but it was not taken serious-
ly. However, the distorting effect is serious indeed. At 2 percent interest
and no inflation, the zero bracket taxpayer can, through lending or bor-
rowing, buy or sell for 61 cents a claim on one dollar of real purchasing
power 25 years hence. For the 35 percent bracket taxpayer the price is 72
cents. At an inflation rate of 10 percent, and the same apparent "real"
interest rate of 12 percent, the price for the zero bracket taxpayer is still
61 cents but for the 35 percent bracket taxpayer it is $1.74. That kind of
difference has to matter and even at the relatively modest inflation rate
of 5 percent, the 35 percent taxpayer confronts a negative real after-tax
interest rate.
Second, I am among the few who thinks we are missing an opportu-
nity to accomplish real simplification. In my opinion, the path to genu-
ine simplicity, not to mention equity and efficiency, leads through
consumption-oriented taxation using cash-flow accounting. However,
to pursue that subject would break the bounds of both my time limit and
my discussant’s license.